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# What Did We Really Get for the Bill Walsh TIF?
- URL: https://www.thestreatorstandard.com/f/what-did-we-really-get-for-the-bill-walsh-tif/
- Published: 2025-06-25T15:01:14.000Z
- Updated: 2026-10-19T13:59:02.000Z
- Author: The Streator Standard
- Tags: Opinion

*And what didn’t we get because of it?*

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/e9/ce/e9cef966-7d64-4cad-8a00-a2753d6b59d3/content/images/2026/10/img-062.jpg)

**From the Mailbag**  
*An anonymous reader asks: What was the sales tax revenue over the life of the TIF, employment data, and otherwise, the total cost/benefit? Someone will still be paying taxes on the property. The development may have not otherwise developed with TIF, then no increased property taxes. And what kind of increased demand for public services, i.e. schools, libraries, etc. were created by the development, or was it to be just more money for those taxing districts?*

It’s a fair question. And one worth answering with clear eyes and long memories.

Let’s start with what we *do* know: the TIF wasn’t used to attract a new business to Streator. Bill Walsh was already here. The TIF simply helped Mr. Walsh relocate and expand—at public expense—by covering roughly **one-third of the cost to develop a new facility**. That public subsidy—originally thought to be around **$1 million**, but later shown to be closer to **$1.55 million**—wasn’t an investment in new industry. It was a financial favor for an existing business.

### 💵 Sales Tax Revenue Over the Life of the TIF

Tom Jacob, the city’s TIF attorney at the time, publicly stated the **Bill Walsh dealership was projected to generate $2.5 million** in combined sales and property taxes over 23 years. Of that:

- **$880,000** was expected to go to the City of Streator (mostly from sales tax)
- That breaks down to **\~$38,000/year**
- The city also received about **$24,000/year** in redirected property tax revenue

However, **94% of all new property tax revenue** was funneled right back into the TIF to reimburse Walsh for site work, landscaping, lighting, interest buy-downs, and more. Most of the new money never touched a school, library, or public safety budget.

### 75% of the Sales Tax, Gone

Under the agreement, **only 25% of the local sales tax** generated by the dealership stayed with the city. The remaining 75% was diverted to repay the development costs.

If the dealership did $5 million in sales each year, that would generate about **$50,000/year** in local sales tax. Of that, only **$12,500/year** went into the city’s general fund.

Over 23 years:

- **$287,500** was kept by the city
- **$862,500** was siphoned into the TIF

### 👷 Employment Data

The project was expected to create **15 jobs**—mostly in sales and service. But:

- No wage floors or job guarantees were included
- Many of the jobs likely shifted from the old dealership
- No one verified if the jobs stayed, grew, or were lost

This wasn’t employment development. It was a reshuffling.

### 💰 Total Cost/Benefit Estimate

Using numbers from city records and analysis by Ed Benner:

#### **Costs (Public Subsidies via TIF):**

- Land acquisition: **$419,000**
- Site prep, design, lighting, display pads, interest buy-downs, legal fees: **\~$1.1 million**
- **Total Subsidy to Developer:** **\~$1.55 million**

#### **Benefits to City (over 23 years):**

- Sales tax: **\~$880,000**
- Modest redirected property tax: **\~$552,000**
- **Total City Revenue:** **\~$1.43 million**

That’s a **net loss of \~$120,000**, *not including* the millions withheld from:

- Streator High School District
- Grade School District 44
- Bruce Township
- Streator Public Library

These institutions received *no* real benefit. They were locked out of the growth they helped make possible.

### 🚗 Car Dealerships Aren’t Transformative

Let’s be blunt: car dealerships don’t transform cities. They exist to sell a product, not build community. They often require large lots, create little foot traffic, and operate in a self-contained bubble. Cities across the country have new dealerships without TIFs. The difference? Those owners assumed the risk themselves.

This project could have happened without public money. But it would’ve required Bill Walsh to invest more of his own. Instead, he got a sweetheart deal—paid for by every homeowner, every teacher, every police officer, and every small business owner who *didn’t* get a public subsidy.

### 🧠 The Hazlitt Test: The Unseen Costs

In *Economics in One Lesson*, Henry Hazlitt urges us to ask:

> “What is the unseen consequence of this policy?”

In this case:

- What small businesses weren’t supported while this dealership was?
- What public works project didn’t happen because funds were tied up?
- What new housing or retail might have developed if the market wasn’t distorted by public favoritism?

The **dealership is the seen**.  
The **lost opportunities are the unseen**.

We can’t point to what *could’ve been*, but we can count what wasn’t:  
New local entrepreneurs. Better roads. Upgraded parks. Restored buildings. Financial flexibility.

We’ll never know what Streator didn’t get. We only know what it paid for—and what it got in return.

### 🏚️ And Now?

The dealership stands, but the public subsidy is spent. The jobs are long forgotten. And the building? Soon to be vacant**.**

The city carried the risk. Bill Walsh got the reward.

### 📣 Got Better Numbers? We Want Them.

If you have sales receipts, job records, detailed analysis, or copies of the original development agreement—send them in. We’re not looking for gotchas. We’re looking to get it right.

Because it’s not just about the past—it’s about the next deal that comes along.

**— The Streator Standard**  
*Wary of handouts. Hopeful for hometowns. Always thinking about the unseen.*